The Constitutional Court has repeatedly addressed the question of whether courts may infer one party’s recognition of the other party’s claim in a legal action: “Courts should show caution and be restrictive when considering whether to issue a default judgment by which a defendant is deemed to have acknowledged the plaintiff’s claim” (para. 28 of Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 2693/16, February 14, 2017; para. 9 of Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 1261/15, October 13, 2016). The court maintains that default judgments should not be issued “if the defendant is not indifferent to the action and has not been obstructing the proceedings through its passivity, trying to ‘outsmart’ the court or delaying the proceedings through its actions” (see para. 28, Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 2693/16, February 14, 2017).
The case law supports the view that section 114b (5) of the Civil Procedure Code, i.e. the basis for the inferred recognition of claims, is meant to sanction defendants who are passive and unwilling to take part in the proceedings. The issue here is not “whether, to what extent or how well the defendant has expressed its view on the matter” (para. 18, Constitutional Court decision file no. II. ÚS 1298/17, August 18, 2017). Rather, the Constitutional Court believes that the inferred recognition of a claim under section 114b (5) “is not acceptable and a default judgment cannot be issued in cases where the defendant has clearly indicated that it rejects the claim and is interested in taking part in the proceedings and resolving the dispute” (para. 26, Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 1024/15, August 1, 2016).
For a default judgment of this type to be issued, all requirements under section 153a of the Civil Procedure Code must be duly, unambiguously and demonstrably met (Constitutional Court decision file no. III. ÚS 454/04, March 30, 2006). Unless all these legal formalities are complied with, the court may not infer the recognition of the claim (see Constitutional Court decision file no. IV. ÚS 883/15m October 1, 2015).
A decision issued in violation of these principles would be invalid and incompatible with the constitutional system, and especially with Act no. 2/1993 Coll., the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as amended (the “Charter”). Most glaringly, it would fail to comply with the basic procedural requirements of the rule of law. As such, it would violate the constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights of the defendant, including the right to a fair trial and judicial protection (articles 36 and 38 of the Charter). The Constitutional Court notes that a default judgment “involves a significant intervention against the standing of a party to court proceedings, resulting in the court’s irreversible refusal to examine the merits of the case” (see para.22, Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 2693/16, February 14, 2017). The same decision concludes that “whenever it is apparent from a defendant’s actions that it disagrees with an action and intends to contest a claim, any mechanical application of section 153a (3) of the Civil Procedure Code is incompatible with the basic principles of that Code and, as such, with the right to fair trial” (see para. 22, Constitutional Court file decision no. I. ÚS 2693/16, February 14, 2017; see also para. 8 of decision file no. IV. ÚS 842/16, July 19, 2016).
In its judgments, the Constitutional Court has reiterated that courts assessing parties’ filings should always take the approach that upholds the parties’ rights to judicial protection (see para. 15, Constitutional Court file decision no. I. ÚS 354/15, November 19, 2015; Constitutional Court file decision no. II. ÚS 1298/17 dated August 18,2017).
The Constitutional Court has been unwavering in its view that any erroneous or unjust application of section 114b (5) of the Civil Procedure Code results in not just the denial of a party’s right to be heard and comment on its case under article 38 (2) of the Charter but also the denial of a fair trial and possibly even of justice (denial of the right to access a court) under article 25 (1) of the Charter (para. 26, Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 1024/15, August 1, 2016; para. 12, Constitutional Court file decision no. IV. ÚS 1252/16, September 6, 2016; para. 23, Constitutional Court decision file no. I. ÚS 3263/13, September 12, 2016).
The statutory provisions on default judgments (i.e. section 114b(5) and section 153a (3) of the Civil Procedure Code) do not appear to give judges any room for discretion when deciding on these matters. These judges are, however, required to adhere to the general rules of a fair trial, which protect not only the equal standing of the parties to a legal action but also their right to access the judicial process (Constitutional Court decision file no. IV. ÚS 2503/13, April 1, 2014; Constitutional Court decision file no. IV. ÚS 544/05, October 17, 2006 and related decisions).